made an immense investment of political and economic capital. The mass media, with central government approval, provided extensive coverage of existing problems and clean-up efforts. The attention forced involved actors-the central government, provincial government, environmental protection bureaus (EPBs), and factories-to take the cleanup seriously because failure would be embarrassing to all.
In response to central government requirements, Jiangsu Province issued directives aimed at cleaning up Tai Lake by the end of 1998 (the lake is in Jiangsu Province although the southern edge of the lake comprises part of the border with Zhejiang Province). According to Jiangsu government reports, by December 31, 1998, wastewater discharged from enterprises basically met discharging standards. Of 1,178 key enterprises discharging more than 100 tons/day of wastewater or 30 kg/ day COD (chemical oxygen demand), 143 closed for a variety of reasons, and 83% met the discharge standards. Enterprises continuing operation attained a 97.3% compliance rate (Yu & Yang, 2001 ). According to January 1999 press reports, all factories that failed to meet emission standards by the new year were in fact shut down: "There was no bargaining." Furthermore, in the China Daily, Jiangsu officials claimed that 90% of targeted factories had complied with environmental requirements and that postdeadline sweeps had found no surreptitious polluting or backsliding ("Taihu's Water Quality Improves," 1999).
The reports surrounding the still ongoing Tai Lake clean-up efforts are encouraging. It seems that the central and provincial governments are serious about their efforts to clean up the lake and the surrounding regions (Interview 15 in Appendix). The involved governments have shown their readiness to ignore the short-term economic costs of factory closures and stoppages in the interest of longer term benefits.
Although at first blush this is a success story, further examination raises doubts. Sentiment has grown that the Tai Lake case is at best only a partial success story (Interview 39 in Appendix). Many factories that met emission standards set by the government did so only by diverting their effluent elsewhere or by temporarily slowing production. Once the spotlight left the region, they returned to their earlier polluting ways, occasionally with the collaboration of local EPB officials ("State Plan for Protection of the Ecosystem Good for All," 1999). Opinion pieces in newspapers reflect public frustration over the fact that many of the most polluting factories were neither investigated nor shut down by officials in the first place.
Environmental policy enforcement relating to Tai Lake illustrates a situation where the Chinese state invested immense prestige, funds, and effort to overcome an environmental problem through better policy enforcement. And yet despite state efforts, the Tai Lake case appears at best to be an equivocal success. What explains the record of the Tai Lake environmental initiative? How does this case reflect on the larger question of the effect of state capacity on environmental policy enforcement?
Drawing on China as a case study, this article focuses on state capacity as a predictive tool in the policy enforcement sphere. I open by explaining my focus on the state capacity-enforcement relationship. I then define the components of state capacity and test the causal impact of state capacity on effective enforcement of environmental regulations. Testing involves analyzing data collected from 10 representative Chinese provinces combined with a case study of one particular provinceJiangsu. Finally, I argue that two additional variables-commitment and public participation-must be included in any analysis of the state capacity-environmental policy enforcement relationship.
State Capacity as a Useful Measure
A large number of studies has identified a variety of factors influencing policy implementation (Edwards, 1980; Etzioni, 1968; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Young, 1979) . In this particular case I ask, does state capacity play a role, and to the extent that state capacity influences compliance, how does it do so? Implicit in this question is a basic methodological assumption. I choose on both the dependent and independent variables something that is occasionally frowned on (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994) . Critics might question the point of looking at a variable that may not prove to be the most significant in influencing compliance. Should one not first illustrate why the state capacity-compliance relationship is significant? The approach I take is reasonable when two conditions hold: "first, the value of a variable in a complex system is changing significantly, or is thought likely to change significantly in the future; and, second, researchers want to know if this change will affect other variables that interest them" (Homer-Dixon, 1995, p. 2) . 1 My goal is not to explain all the factors that contribute to compliance with environmental policy or even what may be the most important factor(s) (although I begin with the belief that state capacity is significant); rather, I attempt to explain the influence of one specific factor-state capacity. Can this independent variable (state capacity) in particular cause changes in the value of the dependent variable (compliance) (Figure 1) ? Dessler (1992) addressed this approach to research. According to Dessler, one may consider a phenomenon to be an outcome of some process and search for conditions influencing its occurrence. Conversely, one may choose a factor known or thought to play a role in causing the phenomenon and analyze the tendencies of this factor in isolation. The first example (a focus on outcome) tells the researcher what configuration of conditions leads to some specified observed outcome. The second (a focus on factor) tells the researcher what outcomes tend to be brought about by the workings of a specific factor.
In his book A System of Logic, Mill (1930) suggested that we should be working toward generalizations that focus on the factors that produce the outcomes, not the outcomes themselves. In other words, we should concentrate on factor knowledge as opposed to outcome generalizations as are featured in "if-then" explanations. Mill noted that when explaining outcomes we are dependent on determining the various causes. We may construct a logical and persuasive analysis explaining the observed outcome only to discover that perhaps we have been completely mistaken because we missed one contributing factor. If on the other hand we focus on the tendency of a factor, this danger disappears. No matter the outcome, that specific factor will always have the same observed tendency.
China as a Case Study
China is a good choice from a methodological perspective. The Chinese bureaucratic structure of government provides a valuable opportunity for comparative research among China's different provinces. All provinces are required to enforce the same environmental laws and regulations promulgated by the central government. However, provincial success in enforcement efforts varies widely across the provinces (Schwartz, 2001) . This variance allows assessment of provincial capacity as a factor in the relative effectiveness of enforcement efforts.
Another reason to focus on China as a case study is its growing global environmental impact. Rapid growth has brought with it substantial environmental damage that in some cases has slowed economic development, boosted domestic dissatisfaction, and contributed to instability within the country. On the international level, China is damaging the global environment through escalating sulfur dioxide flows that contribute to acid rain and soaring carbon dioxide output that aggravates global warming. The international community is concerned by the potential for the global environmental devastation should the Chinese government fail to successfully develop and enforce environmental policies. However, Chinese efforts have been complicated by the increasing jurisdictional tensions between the Chinese center and periphery, a result of decentralization and growing regional autonomy.
However, before analyzing the causal role of state capacity in environmental policy enforcement, we must consider the meaningfulness of the policies being enforced. The relative meaningfulness of environmental regulations, laws, and standards (subsumed under the term policies) influences the state capacity-enforcement relationship. If environmental policies are meaningless-having no real constraining effect on polluters and no ameliorative effect on the environment-enforcement may be relatively straightforward and therefore not a true reflection of capacity. Only meaningful policies demanding real effort on the part of the implementing authority represent a true test of the role of capacity in enforcement.
Evaluating the Meaningfulness of Chinese Environment Policies
"The [Chinese] government pays more attention to the environment than was the norm in virtually all western countries at comparable stages of their economic development" (Smil, 1998, p. iv) . This statement by Vaclav Smil, a leading expert on China's environment, points to an advanced level of environmental awareness among Chinese officials. However, does environmental awareness suggest the existence of meaningful policies and effective action? To be considered meaningful, China's environmental protection efforts must be based on credible standards, laws, and regulations.
If, for example, regulations for toxic waste are developed by politicians interested in appeasing industry and are limited to requiring that all toxic waste be dyed orange prior to disposal directly into water sources, it is clear that the regulations are basically meaningless (because orange dye can have no ameliorative effect on the toxicity of waste). However, if regulations are scientifically sound, having been developed in cooperation with environment experts, and require real alleviation of pollution threats, the regulations can be deemed meaningful.
A comparison of China's environmental standards, laws, and regulations with internationally accepted norms provides a good measure of meaningfulness. China's laws and regulations are more difficult to compare. Laws and regulations are crafted differently throughout the world, often differing in wording, general nature, and interpretation. China's laws and regulations are here evaluated based on information from interviews with international and Chinese experts.
According to Chinese standards, surface water is classified into five categories based on the intended use of the water.
2 Categories II and III can be readily compared with World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines. Table 1 provides a selection of constituents and their maximum allowed concentrations in drinking water based on Chinese and WHO standards.
China's Ambient Air Quality Standard (GB 3095-96) (1998) is comparable with WHO air quality recommendations. As with surface water, China's air quality standards are divided into categories. A Type I region includes natural conservation areas, scenic spots, and historic sites as well as regions requiring special protection. A Type II region includes residential areas, mixed regions of commercial traffic and residences, cultural areas, industrial areas, and rural areas. Type III region refers to special industrial areas. 2. Category I mainly applies to water sources and nature reserves; Category II applies to areas protected as centralized drinking water sources, sanctuaries for rare species of fish, spawning grounds for fishes and shrimps, and so on; Category III applies to drinking water of lower quality, sanctuaries for common species of fish, and swimming zones. Categories IV and V apply to water intended for industrial and agricultural activities, respectively. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that China possesses similar standards to those of the WHO. This conclusion is further supported by Ma Zhong, director of the Beijing Environment and Development Institute. Ma noted that some water pollution standards are actually more stringent in China than in the United States (Interview 22 in Appendix). According to the foreign manager of a large European joint venture in Nanjing, the limits on mercury set by the Chinese are almost identical to limits in Europe and Chinese air pollution requirements for his factory are more stringent than equivalent requirements in many parts of Western Europe (Interview 6 in Appendix). Based on these measures, China's environment standards can be viewed as meaningful.
A comparison of the results in
What of Chinese laws and regulations? Laws (Falu) are China's highest level of legislation. China's 1989 Environment Protection Law is an example of laws (Interview 22 in Appendix). However, Chinese laws are very general and require interpretation, specification, and enforcement. Greater clarity comes at the next level down-regulations (Fa Gui). Fa Gui are released by the state council. Below the Fa Gui is an additional level of regulation-the Gui Zhang. This type of regulation is produced at the ministry level. Gui Zhang provide greater detail and technical information than the Fa Gui. Regulations and laws can also be promulgated and enacted at the provincial and local levels. However, these may not be weaker than central government counterparts (Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995) . 56 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT According to the deputy director for law enforcement supervision at the SEPA, the SEPA is charged with preparation of environmentally related laws and regulations for central government consideration (Interview 1 in Appendix). In the process of developing laws and regulations, feedback is provided by interested ministries and departments, members of parliament, and the international community. The development process includes producing drafts of laws to be distributed to government departments and to local governments to solicit feedback. The feedback must be considered in the preparation of the law. After receiving feedback, the draft law is submitted to the state council office for legislative affairs. This office may once again solicit feedback from interested parties before the draft is submitted to the premier. Following approval by the premier, the National People's Congress reviews the draft, which undergoes two or three readings before finally being approved. The process may take from 3 to 10 years but has recently accelerated, as exemplified by the 1995 law on solid waste that took only 4 months (Interview 1 in Appendix).
An important source of input regarding the development of regulations and laws is the research institutes that are affiliated with the SEPA. The SEPA has 15 institutes directly under its control, including the Chinese Academy of Environmental Science, Nanjing Institute of Environment Science, and the South China Environment Institute (Interview 41 in Appendix). Following the administrative reorganization of the Chinese government that occurred in the summer of 1998, the SEPA has been drastically cutting financial support for its affiliated institutes. As a result, the institutes are forced to find alternative funding sources. Greater financial independence from the government brings greater freedom to express views that may conflict with those of the government. Of course, constraints on independence may be felt from the new funding institution. If research is funded by industry, it is possible that the results may at least partially reflect industry interests.
Semi-independent organizations (often described as GONGOsgovernmental, nongovernmental organizations) such as the Policy Research Center for Economy and Environment (Sino-Japanese Center for Environment) or the Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy also play an active role developing regulations and laws. These organizations receive some funding from the SEPA but are often also funded by extragovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations (Interview 63 in Appendix).
In the case of the Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, 5% of funding comes from the SEPA with additional funding coming from the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Bank, and other sources (Interview 64 in Appendix). According to an official in this organization, whereas most laws and regulations are derived from the experiences of provincial-and local-level EPB officials, universities and institutes such as his are often asked to develop new regulations to address specific issues (Interview 38 in Appendix). They are also occasionally asked to comment on draft regulations/laws that are already under development. In addition, these organizations may make suggestions regarding areas where they deem regulations or laws should be promulgated. Once again, growing financial independence has enabled these institutes to make more independently conceived, if still constrained, recommendations.
As part of the recommendation process, institutes conduct research projects that are directly related to specific policy areas. The results of the research are then provided to the SEPA as part of the regulatory and legal development process. For example, at the behest of the central government, the SEPA began to develop policy recommendations to prevent a recurrence of flooding along the Yangze River such as occurred in the summers of 1998, 1999, and 2002 . The SEPA requested that the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science conduct research toward developing such policies. This institute was once solely SEPA funded but has in recent years found funding from other sources. Asked by the SEPA to assess conditions along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangze River, the institute produced a report with recommendations and advice to the SEPA for policy development (Interview 41 in Appendix).
In general, Chinese nongovernmental (NGO) and government officials were of the opinion that Chinese regulations and laws on the environment were meaningful in the context of a developing country (Interviews 1, 14, 21, 23, 24, 38, 39 , and 41 in Appendix). Although not attaining to Western standards, given China's status as a developing country, its regulations and laws on the environment can be deemed meaningful. Thus, research on the state capacity-enforcement relationship reflects a true assessment of capacity.
Components of State Capacity
A widely quoted definition describes state capacity as "the ability of states to implement official goals, especially over the opposition of powerful social groups, or in the face of difficult economic circumstances" (Skocpol, 1990, p. 9) This, similar to other definitions of state capacity, tends to rely heavily on a behavioral description of the state. Consequently, researchers are constrained to identify levels of state capacity retrospectively based on past success or failure of a state in achieving its goals. For progress in the field, it is critical to specify components of state capacity that will allow researchers to predict when states are likely to succeed in enforcing their policies effectively. Some efforts have been made in this direction (Baum & Shevchenko, 1999; Geddes, 1994; Hao & Lin, 1994; Migdal, 1988) . However, most propose indicators that are too ambiguous to allow translation into rigorous empirical operations that can be employed in predictive research. To evaluate the impact of state capacity as a predictive tool I first identify three components of state capacity:
• human capital: the technical and managerial skill level of individuals within the state and its component parts;
• fiscal strength: the financial capacity of the state or of a given component of the state; this capacity is a function of both current and reasonably feasible revenue streams as well as demands on that revenue;
• reach/responsiveness: the degree to which the state is successful in extending its ideology, sociopolitical structures, and administrative apparatus throughout society (both geographically and into the socioeconomic structures of civil society); the responsiveness of these structures and apparatus to the local needs of the society. If state capacity alone is sufficient for effective enforcement, a provincial government enjoying high human capital, fiscal strength, and reach/responsiveness is a government that enjoys high capacity and should therefore enjoy the potential to effectively enforce environmental policy. This hypothesis is tested by conducting a comparative statistical analysis focusing on 10 provinces: Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Yunnan, and Guangxi. These provinces represent the full range of possible capacities in China, with the coastal provinces tending to enjoy high capacity and the northeastern and inland provinces suffering progressively lower capacity.
Each component of state capacity is comprised of a gross and proximate measure (Table 3 ). The gross measure describes the general status of a province in relation to the specific component. The proximate measure is more specific, describing the status of the province in relation to environmental policies. A formula describes each of the six components of state capacity.
The question of relative variable weighting inevitably arises. Do gross measures carry more or less weight than proximate measures? Can the three state capacity variables be ranked according to their importance to the overall measure of state capacity? For example, is human capital more influential as an aspect of state capacity than reach/responsiveness? Is reach/responsiveness less important than fiscal strength?
Gross measures have broad theoretical use and are reliable across any number of issues. They can be related to health care, economic policy, or , 1987-1997) , Chinese provincial statistical yearbooks (Guangdong Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Guangxi Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Heilongjiang Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Henan Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Hubei Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Hunan Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Jiangsu Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Liaoning Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Shandong Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 Yunnan Sheng Tongji Ju, 1986 ) , and China Environment Yearbooks for the years 1988 (Environment Yearbook Editorial Board, 1988 .
any other topic that may interest the researcher. However, greater scope and applicability come at the expense of specificity. Proximate measures are issue oriented, providing a more detailed and textured picture of capacity in a specific policy area. Obviously, greater detail comes at the expense of wider applicability. Both gross and proximate measures provide useful information relating to the variables they measure. They are also related to one another as they measure different aspects of the same variable. I therefore ascribe to them equal importance and equal weight (Figure 2) .
The three measures of state capacity are not easily ranked in a hierarchical relationship. Each variable plays an important role as a component of state capacity. Instead of ranking the variables, I compare the two results for each variable across each province.
Relative state capacity is assessed using formulas based on the mean for each of the variables over a 10-year span. The results of these formulas are supplemented with a graphical analysis to account for improvement or deterioration of capacity over time. A data set spanning 10 years is used because relying on fewer than 10 years of data runs the risk of missing trends and overstating the impact of exceptional events. By contrast, including too many years in the analysis risks complicating the analysis with overwhelming quantities of data. In addition, the period studied-1987 to 1996-encompasses the start of significant economicreform-related environmental damage and recognition by government officials that such damage must be alleviated. It is during this period that efforts to address environmental degradation begin in earnest. Because there is no magical demarcation point where provinces suddenly possess high capacity, the analysis relies on a relative capacity scale (Table 4) .
Evaluating Provincial Capacity and Compliance
Based on the formulas for the components of state capacity, four highcapacity and six low-capacity provinces are identified (Schwartz, 2001 ). 
Note: H = high; L = low. The number represents relative score (Schwartz, 2001 ).
The high-capacity provinces are Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong.
If capacity indeed influences enforcement, it is then reasonable to expect those provinces identified as enjoying high capacity to be those where enforcement is relatively effective. Relative effectiveness (of enforcement) is measured using data available on environmental protection efforts by each of the provinces. These data include information on specific, provincial-level emissions targets set by the central government. The data also include actual emissions. Enforcement effectiveness is measured by comparing the relative ability of provinces to attain the targets (the gap between targeted emissions levels and actual emissions levels) (Environment Yearbook Editorial Board, 1997; State Statistical Bureau, 1989) . These results are supplemented with the opinions of environment specialists within government and the China NGO community (Interviews 14, 20, 22, 23, 24 , and 38 in Appendix). The result is a correlation between provinces enjoying high capacity and the effectiveness of their enforcement efforts (Table 5) . Only one province, Hubei, falls outside the predicted correlation.
However, the existence of a correlation does not suffice to identify the causal direction of a relationship. Does state capacity influence compliance, or does compliance influence state capacity? This question is addressed by dropping down a level of analysis to the subprovincial level in one sample province and extrapolating the results across the remaining provinces.
The Jiangsu Case
Subprovincial analysis relies on process tracing-constructing a causal network by assembling bits and pieces of evidence into a causal pattern. Whether a piece is modified or added depends on whether the modification fits what already has been constructed and whether it 64 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT strengthens the network. If the modification creates more puzzles than it solves, it is rejected (George & McKeown, 1985) . What stimuli do actors attend to? What is the decision-making process that the actor follows when confronted with stimuli? What is the actual behavior that results? If the outcome is consistent with the predictions, the possibility of a causal relationship is strengthened. Data for this analysis derive from extensive interviews with EPB officials, factory officials, and academics in Jiangsu province. Jiangsu provincial government commitment to environmental protection is apparent. Jiangsu's EPB director and the provincial governor are extremely supportive of environmental protection initiatives. Indeed, the governor has instructed provincial EPBs to ignore economic concerns and concentrate solely on the environment (Interviews 15, 26, and 31 in Appendix). In addition, the provincial government has increased EPB staff allocations and funding for the purchase of treatment and inspection technologies and for cleaning up pollution accidents (Interview 15 in Appendix). Finally, the provincial government supports a steady improvement in the qualifications of EPB staff and the ongoing training they receive (Interview 28 in Appendix).
Central government pressure has resulted in Jiangsu provincial government efforts to enforce environmental policies. The Jiangsu provincial government has in turn pressured municipal governments under its jurisdiction to follow suit. A comparative analysis of four municipal governments in Jiangsu Province (Nanjing, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, and Nantong) illustrates that pressure from the provincial government has resulted in relatively effective enforcement of environmental policies in high-capacity municipalities. The same analysis illustrates that lowcapacity municipalities fail to achieve equivalent results (Table 6 ).
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Both Nanjing and Suzhou are government centerpieces. The Jiangsu government, seated in Nanjing, wants a city that reflects positively on the government. Known as the city of trees, Nanjing is relatively green in comparison to other large Chinese east coast cities. Nanjing is also filled with signs and banners exhorting the population to protect the environment. Suzhou too is replete with such exhortations of the public. As a tourist city, Suzhou has further incentive to assure a clean environment. As a result, these EPBs are quite busy. The EPB officials interviewed proved both highly committed and willing to work well beyond normal hours. The Nanjing and Suzhou municipal governments openly support tough actions taken by their EPBs.
As noted by one interviewee, awareness of government support has a large impact on the willingness of EPB officials to act. Knowing that the government will not override EPB actions against polluting factories enhances the willingness of EPB workers to act. Zhenjiang and Nantong are both less concerned with projecting an environmentally friendly image. Largely dependent on industry, neither municipality is likely to willingly support action that would constrain economic development and income. As a result, these municipalities are less supportive of EPB efforts to constrain factory output in the interest of an improved environment.
Obvious differences exist among the four municipal EPBs. The differences find reflection in, among other things, the facilities and resources available to EPBs, relations between EPB and factory officials, and the inspection process. The differences point to the fact that the Suzhou and Nanjing EPBs enjoy higher capacity and take enforcement more seriously than their Zhenjiang and Nantong counterparts. This perception is bolstered by the results of interviews conducted with EPB officials from each of the four municipalities (Table 6 ) (Interviews 2, 26, 30, 40, 60, and 61 in Appendix) .
The results to this point reflect the causal influence of state capacity on enforcement of environmental policies in China. However, as illustrated by the Tai Lake example, although capacity to successfully enforce environmental policies may exist, the longer term staying power essential to ensure continued enforcement is at least partially lacking. Clearly, other variables play a critical contributing role in enforcement.
The Role of Commitment and Public Participation in Environmental Policy Enforcement
Two important variables to consider are commitment to the policies by those responsible for policy enforcement and the nature of public participation. Assessing the commitment of those responsible for enforcement is essential both in the policy development stage and throughout the period being evaluated. Imagine a situation where a jurisdiction enjoying high capacity (either in general or specific to the environment) chooses to focus on priorities other than the environment. In such a case, the mere existence of high capacity would likely be insufficient to ensure compliance. State capacity measures the potential to act: The assessed unit may enjoy fiscal resources, human capital, and reach/responsiveness at levels conducive to effective enforcement but may not utilize that potential. What may be lacking is commitment.
Authors looking at state capacity rarely include commitment as a variable. Thus, for example, the Toronto Group 6 Project on Environmen-tal Scarcities, State Capacity and Civil Violence looked at eight separate indicators within two sets-intrinsic characteristics of the state and the state-society relationship (Barber, 1997) . None of the indicators include a measure for commitment. In her work, Theda Skocpol (1990) mentioned commitment but left it outside the definition of state capacity. Commitment is more fully considered in the implementation literature. Stepan (1978) , Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) , Edwards (1980) , and Crosby (1996) all identified commitment as one of the requisite factors for successful implementation. They argued that committed implementing officials are an important condition for successful implementation. My own research suggests that although some EPBs received increased funding, had better educated workers, and enjoyed greater public support, officials occasionally felt mixed in their commitment to take action on the environment and were often unwilling to act despite the tools at their disposal. This is largely the result of the backgrounds of many senior and midlevel environment officials.
Having only developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the EPB in China is relatively young and lacking in status. Due to the low priority historically given to environmental concerns, few environment officials have developed a high level of expertise in their field. Even had officials taken an interest in the environment as students, the rarity of relevant programs greatly limited the opportunity to obtain such an education. As a result, the still young environment bureaucracy relies on seniorand middle-ranking officials with often limited environmental backgrounds. In many cases, such officials are less knowledgeable and may therefore be less likely to exhibit a commitment to environmental protection. These officials may consider their positions in the environmental bureaucracy as a transitory stop on the way to "more important" ministries. Because alienating industry with sanctions would be counterproductive to the strengthening of their network of relationships, in many cases they take little or no interest in the environment and would prefer to avoid sanctioning polluters (Interview 31 in Appendix). Positions of responsibility are still often apportioned based on nonmeritocratic considerations, with many important posts held by well-connected but at best mildly committed bureaucrats (Interview 40 in Appendix).
The lack of commitment often found among officials opens the door to an important aspect of low commitment contributing to ineffective enforcement-corruption. Relations among the three main players-the government, EPB, and industry-are often very close. When EPBs identify pollution infractions they bring them to the attention of the relevant level of government. The government then involves industry. As a result, a cordial relationship may develop among these actors (Interview 29 in Appendix). Such relations open the door to corrupt behavior. Cases have been documented of environment officials offered large bribes to declare factories nonpolluting (Interviews 26 and 40 in Appendix).
Bribes must be tempting to environment officials with monthly salaries that generally average between 400 and 1,200 Yuan ($55 to $160). By contrast, in some cases, officials were highly committed, working long hours in an attempt to develop innovative methods to improve environmental awareness and enforcement even under difficult conditions (Interview 26 in Appendix).
Without a commitment to environmental policy enforcement, the capacity essential to implementation would not exist in the first instance. Only a government committed to environmental protection would invest to develop the required capacity. However, commitment plays a role beyond the early stages of policy development (how are we going to protect the environment?). Even after capacity exists, commitment must remain (how do we ensure that officials continuously enforce the new environmental protection policies?).
A simple example relates to the structure of a bureaucracy that is expected to implement new (or altered) policies. New policies require bureaucrats to adapt existing standard operating procedures to a new reality. In some cases, this involves increasing their own workloads, learning new responsibilities, or even hiring new workers who might threaten the existing hierarchy. Without a clear commitment to the policy from above, ideally shared by the implementing officials, implementation becomes difficult (Crosby, 1996) .
At the first stage, leaders among the political elite must express commitment to a specific cause (environmental protection). Their commitment must then be expressed in the directing of capacity (human capital, reach/responsiveness, and fiscal strength) toward implementing the specific policy. The existence of preliminary commitment increases the likelihood that limited overall capacity available to the leadership is allocated to ensure the implementation of the specific policy (Krasner, 1978) . Once the allocation of capacity occurs, commitment must be maintained and imparted to those charged with implementing the policy. During this later stage, the capacity allocated to implementing the policy may generate a positive feedback loop. Thus, for example, investing in human capital can result in officials who are highly educated and knowledgeable about the issue and therefore more likely to be committed to its advancement. Investment in reach/responsiveness may provide the tools necessary to disseminate information about the importance of the policy, thereby enhancing public awareness, further increasing commitment.
Time and again in the course of interviews, commitment stood out as an important contributing factor influencing environmental policy enforcement. In essence, if a government lacks commitment to environmental protection, high capacity is insufficient. Without a commitment to utilize the capacity available, governments may simply ignore whatever policies exist, no matter how meaningful (Potter, 1999) .
Obviously, commitment alone is also insufficient to ensure enforcement. Without the components of state capacity, commitment is relegated to empty promises. Thus, both commitment and capacity are necessary, and alone neither is sufficient. This is illustrated by the following formula:
where A represents capacity, B represents commitment, and C represents compliance.
In essence, commitment is a component of state capacity. Thus, to ensure being considered a high-capacity state, a state must enjoy high human capital, reach/responsiveness, fiscal strength, and commitment.
An additional factor influencing effective enforcement is public participation (Jahiel, 1998) . The current definition of state capacity emphasizes the importance of the human factor-human capital-"the technical and managerial skill level of individuals within the state and its component parts" (Barber, 1997, pp. 14-15) . However, this emphasis is limited to human capital within the state apparatus (logical given that state capacity is limited to components of the state).
To some extent, public participation is also encompassed by the reach/responsiveness component-"the degree to which the state is successful in extending its ideology, socio-political structures, and administrative apparatus throughout society and the responsiveness of these structures and apparatus to the local needs of the society" (Barber, 1997, pp. 14-15) . The mass media are tools employed by governments to reach out to the public and hear public concerns. EPB education drives are an outreach tool, as are telephone hotlines and complaints offices. However, reach/responsiveness is limited to identifying the means available to the government and the populace; it does not include the results of growing public awareness.
Government officials dislike the negative image of a highly polluted province because it might deter international investors and increase public dissatisfaction. Officials recognize that international investors are increasingly sensitive to environmental issues and may reconsider investment in regions where environmental regulations are being ignored (Clarke & Thomas, 1997) . Public reactions provide further cause for government concern. According to one official, "[the public] might say the government did a bad job" (Bing & Fang, 1997, p. 2) . Publicizing information on the true state of the environment may threaten their region's image, access to foreign investment, and public stability. As a result, there are numerous cases where provincial EPBs simply fail to produce unflattering data on pollution output, often leaving the general public and the central government unaware of environmentally related developments. 7 The Chinese public traditionally felt little responsibility for maintaining public areas (Environmental NGOs in China, 1997) . People did not worry about dumping their garbage in the street or pouring factory waste into local streams. The government was responsible for clean-up. However, public environmental awareness has grown, and as a result, people are more likely to pressure industries to clean up and governments to develop and enforce environmental protection policies. China's citizens are increasingly demanding better air quality, more green spaces, decreased noise pollution, and clean water. 8 Three main sources have contributed to the growing public awareness and resultant activism regarding the environment. These are Chinese environmental NGOs, the mass media, and EPB education units.
In the West, the public (in the form of civil society) is ascribed an increasingly important role in the renegotiation and reconstruction of resource regimes aimed at changing global and local environmental practices (Lipschutz, 1997) . Often in the form of environmental NGOs, these groups force environmental concerns onto the agendas of governments and businesses. NGOs participating in these efforts may be local or international but are very often interconnected, drawing on shared resources and information. Such organizations can and do have a major impact on the perception and protection of the local environment.
As a basic assumption, this view posits the existence of popular organizations working in a political space (varying in size depending on the local political culture and regime type). Whereas some "China hands" point to a growth of such space in China, room for independent political activism remains extremely limited (Interviews 63, 64, 67, 72, 74, and 76 in Appendix) . NGOs first began appearing in China in 1994. According to SEPA (n.d.), China had approximately 2,000 registered environmental NGOs by the year 2000. By contrast, Jennifer Turner and Fengshi Wu (2001) of the Woodrow Wilson Center offered a more conservative esti-mate of 40 such NGOs. Unlike their Western NGO counterparts, Chinese NGOs are not independent of government. Even relatively independent NGOs (as opposed to the more dependent GONGOs discussed earlier) must register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Otsuka, 2002; Wu, 2002 ). China's NGOs are largely dependent on state benevolence and are expected to work within clear government-established limits (Otsuka, 2002) .
Despite these limitations on NGOs, the state recognizes that it is unable to take full responsibility for enhancing public awareness about environment and has therefore increasingly turned to environmental NGOs to play an active role. The state perceives NGOs as a powerful tool to educate a public more likely to believe activist pleas to save the environment than official exhortations to preserve natural resources for the greater good (Environmental NGOs in China, 1997) .
Thus, some Chinese NGOs work outside the government structure and enjoy constrained freedom in the ways they complete their tasks. However, the majority of NGO efforts are limited to educating the public about the importance of the environment and organizing activities such as tree planting or garbage collection campaigns.
One of the most well-known Chinese environmental NGOs is Friends of Nature. Friends of Nature has an active membership of approximately 400 and its own offices in Beijing. It is unusual in that it receives no government funding. The founder and driving force behind Friends of Nature is a highly placed, well-connected government official. These connections enable the founder to convey the Friends of Nature agenda directly to government decision makers and ensure the support and protection of higher ranking government officials. However, according to a highly ranked official in Friends of Nature, despite the access and protection Friends of Nature enjoys, Friends of Nature members cannot criticize the government and cannot lobby for specific policies. Friends of Nature is limited to expressing opinions and criticizing obliquely (Interview 20 in Appendix) . Even this limited freedom may be threatened if and when the founder departs his position. According to interviewed Chinese officials, as independent institutions, China's NGOs have a dismal future (Interview 41 in Appendix). Thus, although domestic NGOs can play a limited role in advancing environmental awareness, the main impact of public participation on enforcement of environment policies must come from elsewhere.
With the tacit approval of the central government, the mass media has increasingly addressed environmentally related issues. Newspapers are publishing a growing number of articles dealing with environment issues. These articles are not restricted to glowing descriptions of government efforts but may contain criticisms of governments that fail to enforce environmental regulations or factories that fail to comply. For example, polluting factories may find themselves included in lists of rogue polluters in national newspapers. Radio and television programs dealing with the environment often include call-in shows and exposes (Friends of Nature, 1995 ; Interview 2 in Appendix).
An additional avenue to utilize public awareness to strengthen enforcement is EPB-sponsored education efforts. China's policy for enhancing environmental awareness and education is found in the "National Action Program for Environmental Publicity and Education (1996 -2010 )" (Environment Yearbook Editorial Board, 1997 . Public support is viewed by EPB officials as a tool to enhance EPB influence vis-à-vis other government ministries and departments. The Nanjing EPB (Jiangsu Province) provides a good example (Interview 2 in Appendix). The Nanjing EPB has an education section that is responsible for the dissemination of environmentally related information. The education section cooperates with the education ministry to develop school curricula for education from kindergarten through university. It prepares television and radio information programs that air daily. It also cooperates with local unions to conduct activities such as tree planting or garbage collection. The Nanjing education section also holds environment seminars for factory managers, providing factory environment officers with information on current regulations and requirements and the latest advances in treatment technologies.
Numerous interviewees in China, including EPB officials, central government officials, and factory officials, noted the influence of an increasingly aware and active public. Factory officials claimed that their environmental awareness had grown immensely in the past 10 years largely due to efforts by EPBs and the media to publicize the importance of the environment (Interviews 4, 9, 12, 13, 36, and 44 in Appendix). Although "green" proclamations by factory officials may be intended solely to deflect public and government ire, that they pay environmental issues attention at all suggests growing awareness, a vast improvement over the past.
Whereas opinions differ on how great an influence public participation has on environmental policy enforcement, the general consensus is that the public does have an impact and that the impact will likely continue to grow. Public participation may take the form of pressure applied on governments to enact and enforce environmental protection policies. In this form, public participation strengthens the commitment of officials to environmental protection (because the public is supportive of their work) and is a tool in the hands of officials in their enforcement capacity (by pressuring the government to provide greater resources). Public participation contributes to a strengthening of EPB capacity (including commitment).
Conclusion
Relying on a cross-provincial comparative study combined with a case study of Jiangsu Province, this article argues that the state plays an important role in environmental policy enforcement in China. Furthermore, the article finds that the state capacity model provides a useful tool to predict the potential for effective state efforts. However, the study also suggests that state capacity alone is insufficient to fully explain relative enforcement. Government commitment to the policies being enforced and public participation are important contributing variables. By including these two additional variables in an analysis (commitment as intrinsic to state capacity and public participation as an external contrib- uting variable), it is possible to predict the likelihood that governments will effectively enforce environmental policies (see Figure 3) . Thus, environmental policy enforcement in the Tai Lake case would improve if the state enjoyed greater capacity (including commitment) and public support for enforcement actions. The impact of state capacity on one hand and public participation on the other on meaningful long-term enforcement of environmental protection policies is best described in matrix form (Table 7) .
Wider Applications of the State Capacity Model
The international community has grown increasingly aware of and concerned with China's steadily deteriorating environment. The impact of this deterioration is felt not only by China but also by China's neighbors and the international community as a whole. With growing international awareness have come initiatives to press China to invest in the environment and assist China in its environmental protection efforts.
Because available assistance will never suffice to overcome the numerous challenges China faces, donors are constantly searching for efficiencies-tools that enable them to identify the strengths and weaknesses of potential aid recipients. The state capacity model enables donors to more efficiently direct the limited aid available. Does a province (or other unit of government) possess the capacity to effectively utilize the aid being proffered? Where are the weaknesses and strengths of the potential recipient? Similar analyses can be conducted by the Chinese central government. With the knowledge derived from such analyses, the central government can more effectively encourage and pressure provinces to initiate environmental protection programs.
Some might argue that information on relative provincial capacity can be detrimental to those regions suffering low capacity. Such regions might be ignored or written off by potential aid providers because they are more likely to misuse aid and/or fail to effectively implement assistance projects. This would be a mistake. Regions suffering weak capacity should not be written off as hopeless and denied aid. On the contrary, aid donor awareness of weaknesses in certain aspects of capacity enables them to develop assistance packages that compensate for those weaknesses. Thus, the state capacity model allows donors to craft more effective and efficient environmentally targeted aid programs. Similarly, weak-capacity provinces may be those most likely to receive funding and support from a Chinese central government that normally leaves environment initiatives to the provinces.
For example, a province enjoying high human capital but suffering low fiscal strength and reach/responsiveness will likely have an EPB capable of developing environmental protection options but may lack the tools to implement the options or explain them in such a way as to gain public support. By relying on the information derived from the state capacity model, donor agencies and the central government can identify these weaknesses in advance and craft assistance packages that compensate for the weaknesses.
The components of state capacity provide researchers with a clear and practical measure to identify factors causally influencing effective environmental policy enforcement in China. However, the value of an analytical tool is greatest if it can be applied to additional cases. Can the state capacity model be utilized in studies of countries other than China?
One practical constraint to transferring the model is that few developing countries are as assiduous as China at collecting and documenting data. The extensive data available on Chinese environmental conditions and activities were essential to the current analysis of the relative capacity and compliance of China's provinces. 9 Another possible constraint is the structure of the environmental protection bureaucracy. Whereas in China the central government is the main source of environmental policies and provinces are responsible for implementation, other countries have different and possibly complicating bureaucratic structures. Furthermore, different traditions, cultures, and histories may influence the choices and decisions made by officials responsible for the environment.
However, these potential constraints are no different than the constraints facing efforts to transfer any model and should not discourage future efforts. Furthermore, there are compelling reasons to make the effort. Developing countries throughout the world face environmental challenges similar to those faced by China. By adjusting for local data availability, conditions, and access (admittedly challenging tasks), the state capacity model can be tested in other countries. Such tests will inevitably involve adapting the model to region-specific realities. Each additional test will strengthen the model, contributing to its future usefulness as an analytic tool.
Can the state capacity model be expanded beyond a study of environmental policy enforcement? Does the model have the potential to provide insight into other policy enforcement areas? For example, can the state capacity model be utilized to predict the likelihood of successful policy enforcement in the field of health care provision or tax collection? Only by applying the model to other issues can its broader applicability be evaluated.
